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Abstract
The literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants of the electorate’s vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the
demanders of votes—candidates, political parties, and interest groups—have
strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day.
The authors test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of
holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building
winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials
convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we find, after controlling for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises
voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections.
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[Rod] Blagojevich joins a long list of Illinois governors who have been
charged with crimes, four of the past nine of whom saw jail time.
—Associated Press 2011a

Most of the existing literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants
of vote supply. Ever since Downs (1957) advanced his model of the rational
voter, whose decision to participate in elections hinges on a comparison of
the benefits and costs of voting to him personally, considerable scholarly
effort has been devoted to identifying the factors that either motivate or
deter voters from going to the polls on Election Day. The stylized facts
deduced from empirical analyses of aggregate voting data suggest that turnout rates tend to be higher among voters who are older, have more years of
schooling, and earn higher incomes. On the other hand, turnout rates tend to
be lower where the requirements for registering to vote are more onerous,
on days when the weather is bad, and where there is no explicit penalty for
not voting. The weight of the evidence also suggests that, because one vote
is more likely to be decisive when the margin of victory is thin, voter participation is higher in ‘‘close’’ elections than those in which a candidate or
ballot issue wins by a landslide.
However, if the supply of votes depends at least in part on the instrumental consequences of voting, many of the same forces also will animate
the behavior of the elected politicians who demand the electorate’s votes.
Rational candidates for public office, political parties, interest groups, and
other organizations who support them must balance the benefits and costs
of the effort required to win an election. In order to prevail at the polls,
successful candidates must help solve the collective action problem faced
by the members of their hoped-for winning coalitions, among whom the
spoils of victory will be shared and who therefore individually will be
tempted to free ride. Politicians, in short, must become strategic actors
in the electoral process, working to raise the benefits and lower the costs
of voting in ways similar to group leaders and elite actors who energize
and mobilize voters to turn out on Election Day (Jacobson and Kernell
1983; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999).
The efforts expended by candidates and their supporters to win political
office take many forms. In competing for votes, politicians extol their own
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virtues and disparage their opponents, engage in advertising to promote their
policy positions and to enhance their name recognition, make promises to
support new programs or defend existing ones that transfer wealth to key
electoral constituencies, and pledge preferential treatment in the awarding
of government jobs and procurement contracts. They may also offer selective
incentives (Olson 1965) to get out the vote on Election Day, such as providing transportation to the polls or distributing ‘‘walking around money.’’
Electioneering effort on the part of candidates, especially when it takes
the form of personal contacts with prospective voters (Kramer 1970–1971),
helps resolve the Downsian paradox of not voting, and expending more
effort increases turnout, even holding campaign spending constant (Cox and
Munger 1989). Linking politicians’ demands for votes with vote supply in
this way suggests that voter turnouts will be heavier when candidates invest
more time and money campaigning for office—and they rationally will do
so when the expected payoff from winning is greater. The expected payoff
to a political campaign, in turn, is equal to the probability of winning times
the anticipated value of public office minus the costs of mobilizing the votes
needed for victory (Karahan, Coats, and Shughart 2006).
While the value of a political office depends on many things, including
the pay, the perks, and the prestige it offers, we turn attention in what follows to the opportunities made available by positions of public trust for collecting corruption rents. Unlawful though it may be, the possibility of
engaging in bribe taking and other illegal activities raises the expected
return to winning an election over and above that which would be anticipated by honest candidates that refrain from misusing their offices for personal gain. If opportunities for corruption increase the expected returns to
office holding, corruption also raises candidates’ demands for votes, hence
leading to greater electioneering effort and, other things equal, heavier voter
turnouts.
As our article’s epigraph suggests, anecdotal evidence of corrupt
politicians extracting rents from their offices abounds. Impeached Illinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich was convicted of a variety of crimes, including
charges related to attempting to sell President Obama’s vacant US Senate
seat (Associated Press [AP] 2011a) and wire fraud associated with a plot
to shake down a racetrack owner for $100,000 in return for Blagojevich’s
support for a 2008 Illinois law that taxes casinos to subsidize racetracks
(AP 2011b).
Other US governors have not been immune to misusing their offices for
personal gain. Governor Dan Miller of Illinois was convicted and sentenced
to federal prison in 1987 for wrongdoing connected with what became
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Table 1. Average Cost per Vote in the Most and Least Corrupt US States
State

Average cost
per vote

Period

a

Most corrupt states
Alaska
$18.11
Illinois
$5.97
Louisiana
$11.27
Mississippi
$9.94

State

Average cost
per vote

Period

a

19782002
19782002
19792003
19792003

Least corrupt states
Oregon
$4.96
Utah
$3.84
Vermont
$3.81
Washington
$3.15

19782002
19802004
19802004
19802004

Note. Source of cost per vote: Jensen and Beyle (2003).
a
Rankings calculated as average number of convictions per million population, from US Department of Justice, ‘‘Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity
Section’’ (various years).

known as the savings and loan scandal. Alabama Governor Guy Hunt was
removed from office in 1993 after being convicted of improperly using
campaign funds. Other governors caught in the Justice Department’s net
include James Guy Tucker, Jr., of Arkansas, entangled in the Clinton
Whitewater scandal and convicted of fraud and conspiracy in 1996; Fife
Symington of Arizona, convicted of fraud the following year; and Louisiana’s Edwin Edwards, found guilty of extortion in 2000.
Table 1 supplies some preliminary evidence that lays the groundwork for
our subsequent analyses of the links between political corruption, electioneering effort, and voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections. There
we show the amounts spent per vote cast by all candidates running for the
governorships of the four most corrupt and four least corrupt US states, as
ranked by the US Justice Department, and then averaged over the gubernatorial elections in our sample. Although the numbers shown in table 1 do not
control for other determinants of campaign spending, the data are consistent
with the conjecture that access to corruption rents raises the value of holding public office and, hence, elicits more electioneering effort on the part of
candidates competing to move into the governor’s mansion.
We test more systematically the hypothesis that voter turnout is
positively related to the prevalence of public corruption using a pooled
time-series data set drawn from gubernatorial elections in the fifty US states
between 1979 and 2005. Estimating a regional fixed effect model that
includes variables commonly used in the existing literature to measure the
benefits and costs of electoral participation, we find that voter turnout is
indeed higher in states where more public officials had been convicted of
corruption, as the demand-side theory predicts.
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The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the second section
summarizes prior scholarly work on the determinants of voter turnout
followed by the section on the description of our data set. The fourth section is on empirical results and is followed by the Conclusion.

Background on Voter Turnout
The issue of voter turnout and electoral closeness is one of the most extensively studied issues in political economy (Matsusaka and Palda 1993). The
theory of the rational voter, who participates in elections to advance his or
her own self-interest, has evolved over time initially applying marginal
analysis to the individual’s decision to vote and focusing more recently
on the role played by political institutions, such as parties, interest group
leaders, and campaign finance laws.
The literature begins with Downs (1957), who contended that individuals
decide whether or not to vote based on the costs and benefits associated with
being decisive in an election. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) expanded on this
view, identifying many socioeconomic factors that motivate voters. The
conclusion drawn from this early work is that if a voter perceives the probability of his or her vote being electorally decisive as being close to zero, the
decision to vote then hinges on whether the consumption or psychic benefits
of voting exceed the costs. Yet, even if the consumption benefits of voting
are large, the Downsian model also implies that, because going to the polls
on Election Day is unlikely to affect the outcome, voters will have little
incentive to become informed about the candidates and ballot issues; they
instead will rationally be ignorant.
Empirical studies of voter turnout relying on theories of instrumental
voting examine a variety of election and constituent characteristics.1 Since
an individual’s vote can be pivotal only if the votes of all other participants
are evenly divided, the implication of Downs’s (1957) model that turnout
will tend to be higher in ‘‘close’’ elections has received the most attention.
Scholars debate how closeness should be measured, and whether these
measures should be computed exante or expost (Abramson, Diskin, and Felsenthal 2007; Endersby, Galatas, and Rackaway 2002). Other scholars have
explored how voters receive and process information about candidates and
election issues (Fridkin and Kenney 1999; Matsusaka 1995). Still others
have focused on the socioeconomic and institutional factors that mobilize
voters. Hill and Leighley (1999) focus on race, Primo and Milyo (2006)
examine the role of campaign finance laws, Cox and Munger (1989) address
campaign expenditures, and Patterson, Caldeira, and Markko (1985)
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emphasize the mobilization of voters via campaign spending, partisan
competition, the closeness of individual contests, and the presence of other,
more salient races on the ballot. Smith (2001) and Tolbert, Grummel, and
Smith (2001) examine turnout in voting on initiatives and referendums.
More recently, evidence gathered in field experiments suggests that
‘‘social pressure’’ plays a role in explaining voter turnout (Gerber, Green,
and Larimer 2008) and that voting is contagious in the sense that exposing
one member of a household containing two or more registered voters to a
get-out-the-vote message raises the voting propensity of the others by about
60 percent (Nickerson 2008).
According to Matsusaka and Palda (1993), Matsusaka (1995), and
Matsusaka and Palda (1999), the rational voter theory has produced mixed
empirical results. Specifically, after providing a brief review of the literature, Matsusaka and Palda (1993) argue that the main defect in prior work
is using aggregate voting data to explain what is in fact an individual
decision to participate or not—the so-called ecological fallacy. Relying
on surveys of Canadian voters, Matsusaka and Palda (1999) find no evidence that electoral closeness influences the probability that a potential
voter actually votes. Indeed, they conclude that very little of the variation
in voter turnout can be explained by most of the ‘‘standard’’ independent
variables, such as age, income, and education, leaving much of the observed
variation to myriad unobservable factors. Geys’s (2006) more recent metaanalysis of aggregate-level studies of voter turnout does, however, yield
evidence that participation tends to be greater, ceteris paribus, when elections are closer, candidates spend more, constituencies are less populous
and, hence, voting is more likely to be decisive.
Another strand of the relevant literature examines voter turnout from
the perspectives of the political elites and group leaders who benefit personally from winning an election (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). In this
view, closeness is a significant determinant of turnout, not because it
changes the probability of a single vote being decisive, but rather because
closer elections raise the expected payoff to candidates and their organizations of getting supporters to the polls on Election Day. Candidates
themselves, political parties, and the leaders of other organizations with
important stakes in election outcomes have incentives to work harder at
mobilizing voters in close races because additional votes have a larger
impact at the margin on the probability of winning. Greater electioneering
effort by candidates and the elites who back them tends to raise voter turnout even if perceived closeness is wholly unrelated to the participation
decisions of individual voters (Aldrich 1993).2
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Treating politicians and parties as strategic actors in the electoral process
(Jacobson and Kernell 1983) suggests a demand-side theory of voter turnout, which predicts greater voter participation when candidates and their
organizations invest more time and money in their election campaigns.
More electioneering effort will in turn be forthcoming when the office being
sought is more valuable and when the contest is expected to be close.
Indeed, Nichter (2008) suggests that many pre–Election Day activities
conventionally thought of as being intended to buy the votes of ‘‘swing’’ voters instead are designed to increase the turnout rates of a candidate’s or a
party’s core constituencies. By rewarding loyal voters who show up at the
polls, including those who might not otherwise have turned out, the probability of winning is enhanced without having to monitor actual vote choices.
Some elective offices are more valuable than others for a variety of
reasons, including pay, perks, their usefulness as stepping-stones to higher
political office, and the opportunities they afford for making personal contacts and acquiring human capital that raise the officeholder’s expected
income after his or her public career is at an end. The returns to holding public office also are increased by the chances they provide for engaging in
bribe taking and other corrupt activities. A position of public trust that
offers illegal forms of compensation is worth more than one from which the
incumbent expects merely to draw a fixed government salary and to enjoy
whatever status and lawful nonpecuniary rewards the post confers. Shachar
and Nalebuff (1999) and Andersen, Fiva, and Natvik (2011) both argue that
one motivation for mobilizing voters is that public sector wealth allows
greater rent extraction by office holders, a result that is not directly captured
in the Downsian model.
While the literature has focused on the determinants of corruption, few
researchers have looked at the impact of corruption beyond its chilling
effects on economic growth.3 Recognizing whether corruption increases the
expected returns to office holding it also increases candidates’ demands for
votes, Karahan, Coats, and Shughart (2006) examine the relationship
between voter turnout rates in county supervisor races in Mississippi’s
November 1987 statewide election and the number of incumbent supervisors convicted of corruption in an FBI sting operation (Operation Pretense)
that ran for three years prior to Election Day. Holding other determinants of
voter participation constant, they find that turnout was heavier in twenty-six
of the state’s eighty-two counties where one or more supervisors had been
caught soliciting or accepting bribes from vendors seeking to supply materials needed to maintain county roads and bridges. In a companion study,
Karahan, Coats, and Shughart (2009) find the same positive correlation
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between county supervisor corruption and voter participation in the
November 1988 general election, when voters were given the option of
replacing the status quo decentralized ‘‘beat’’ system of county governance
with a more centralized ‘‘unit’’ system that its proponents contended would
be less corruption prone.4 The work of Karahan, Coats, and Shughart (2006,
2009) serves as a point of departure for the present article. Their empirical
results lend support to a model of voter participation in which opportunities
for corruption increase the returns to holding public office. The model predicts that, holding the probability of detection constant, corruption elicits
more electioneering effort both from incumbents hoping to retain their
offices and by challengers attempting to unseat them. Moreover, the additional investments by candidates and political parties to mobilize their supporters raises voter turnout. In what follows, we extend these ideas to the
national level by exploring the relationship between public corruption and
voter turnout rates in US gubernatorial elections.

Data
To test the hypothesis that public sector corruption leads to greater voter
turnout, we use pooled time-series data from the gubernatorial elections
held in the fifty US states over the period from 1979 to 2005. It is important
to note that in some states gubernatorial elections are held every four years
while in others they are held every two years. Therefore, even though we
cover the 1979–2005 period, we have only seven observations per state for
states where governors serve four-year terms and fourteen observations per
state for states where they serve two-year terms.
Given the possibility of unobserved, unique local characteristics or institutions that tend to be relatively constant over time for a given state, we
would like to estimate our models with state fixed effects. However, a number of the independent variables, including the key variable of interest (corruption), tend to be remarkably stable, at least over the twenty-seven years
our sample spans. Specifically, correlations between the percentage of the
population twenty-five years and over with a bachelor’s degree, voting age
population (VAP), the percentage of the population sixty-five years old or
older and corruption in 1979 and 2005 all exceed .84. Since these variables
change slowly over time, they themselves behave like ‘‘fixed effects’’ and are
highly correlated with the state-specific fixed effects.5 Therefore, we estimate
our models using regional fixed effects, grouping states into nine US census
regions. Each of the nine census regions comprises three to eight states, thus
minimizing the variation in unobserved state characteristics within regions.
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics, definitions, and sources for all
variables. It should be noted that for ease of interpretation, the variables that
are entered in natural logarithms in the models to follow are presented
unlogged in table 2.
The variables chosen for our analysis are those most commonly used in
the turnout literature.6 Voter turnout (TURNOUT), the dependent variable,
is measured as the total number of votes cast in each gubernatorial election
in our sample divided by the corresponding state’s VAP and is taken from
the Statistical Abstract of the United States.7 As the key explanatory variable, CORRUPT, we use data on the number of public officials convicted
of corruption by state by year; the observations are derived from the US
Department of Justice’s 1999 and 2005 ‘‘Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section.’’ This publication lists
the number of federal, state, and local public officials convicted on
corruption-related criminal charges at the state level. The crimes investigated by the Justice Department include a variety of ways in which public
officials may misuse their offices, such as engaging in conflicts of interest,
fraud, violations of campaign finance laws and obstruction of justice.8 Following Glaeser and Saks (2006), to reduce heteroscedasticity, we deflate the
number of convictions by state population.
Given that our empirical model focuses on the relationship between public corruption and voter turnout in US gubernatorial elections, our data set
ideally would include only the state and local officials convicted each year
of misusing their offices. Unfortunately, however, the Justice Department’s
Public Integrity Section reports by state the number of convictions obtained
against individuals holding office at all levels of government, including
members of Congress and other federal officials. Nor does the Justice
Department provide information on the specific criminal charges that led
to each conviction, meaning that we are forced to assign the same weight
in our empirical model to an official found guilty of a minor violation of
state or federal campaign finance laws as is given to one convicted of arguably far more serious bribe taking or obstruction of justice.
Our analysis thus assumes that the number of public officials convicted
of corruption in a particular state is an indicator of the extent to which the
state exhibits a ‘‘culture of corruption.’’ Following the demand-side
approach of Karahan, Coats, and Shughart (2006, 2009), we model voter
turnout in gubernatorial elections as a function of public corruption.
Although our key explanatory variable includes all public officials convicted of corruption in a particular state each year, a dead fish rots from the
head, as the saying goes, and we therefore hypothesize that the office of
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Number of votes cast in gubernatorial election
relative to state’s voting age population
Log of the number of federal, state, and local public
officials convicted of a corruption-related crime by
state relative to state population
Percentage of the population that is of voting age
Percentage of population 65 years old or older
Percentage of the population 25 years and over with a
bachelor’s degree
State unemployment rate
Log of real income per capita
Percentage of population below the poverty line
Winning candidate’s margin of victory over runner-up
¼ ([Winner’s vote total  Runner-up’s vote total]
 [Winner’s votes þ Runner-up votes])  100
Presidential election year 1 ¼ yes; 0 ¼ otherwise
Number of days before election voter must be
registered
Percentage of the population that is African American
Percentage of the population that is female
Dummy variable 1 ¼ candidate is an incumbent;
0 ¼ otherwise.
Dummy variable 1 ¼ candidate is a Democrat;
0 ¼ otherwise.
Dummy variable 1 ¼ candidate is a former governor;
0 ¼ otherwise.

TURNOUT

FRGOV

PARTY

POPBLACK
POPFEMALE
INCUMBENT

PEY
REGDATE

UNEMP
INCOME
POVERTY
CLOSENESS

VAP
POP65
COLLEGE

CORRUPT

Definition

Variable name

Table 2. Variable Definitions Sources and Descriptive Statistics

0.05

0.50

9.28
46.71
0.34

0.22
21.73

5.90
21,326.2
12.79
16.55

71.28
12.32
23.57

14.48

46.46

Mean

0

0

0
2.68
0

0
0

2.3
12,423.4
3.7
0.00004

59.53
2.96
12.3

0

11.77

Min

1

1

36.91
52.45
1

1
50

15.54
37,074.8
27
64

246.09
18.54
35.5

155

77.69

Max

US Census Bureau
US Census Bureau
Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures
Database
Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures
Database
Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures
Database

Statistical Abstract of the United States
Book of the States

Statistical Abstract of the United States
Statistical Abstract of the United States
US Census Bureau, Decennial Census of
Population, 1970–2000
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Statistical Abstract of the United States
US Census Bureau
Statistical Abstract of the United States

US Department of Justice Report to
Congress

Statistical Abstract of the United States

Source
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chief executive is more valuable in a state where corruption is widespread
than it would be in a less corruption-prone jurisdiction.
To control for other factors influencing voter turnout, we introduce additional explanatory variables that have become standard in the literature (Geys
2006). VAP is entered to test the Downsian argument that a larger voting
population reduces the probability that one vote will be decisive. The other
variables included are demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the
state population: the proportion of the population sixty-five years old and
over (POP65), the percentage of the total population twenty-five years old
and over with a bachelor’s degree (COLLEGE), the state unemployment rate
(UNEMP), real state per capita income (INCOME), and the state poverty rate
(POVERTY). These variables hold constant state socioeconomic profiles and
are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, with the exception
of UNEMP and COLLEGE, which were obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the US Census Bureau, respectively.9
We expect older, more educated voters and those who are unemployed to
turn out in greater numbers, as the literature has commonly found.10 We
include per capita income in the model, but the expected sign is ambiguous:
higher incomes may produce lower turnout rates owing to the greater opportunity cost of voting or higher turnout rates as individuals think they have
more at stake personally in the electoral process. Overall, the literature has
produced mixed results on the relation between voter turnout and income.
With respect to the poverty rate, we hypothesize that lower turnout rates
will be observed in states with larger numbers of poor people. Specifically,
income diversity may lower the social pressure to turn out and people with
lower incomes may have lesser stakes in election outcomes.
In addition to the socioeconomic characteristics, we include several statespecific political variables. We enter CLOSENESS, defined as the margin of
victory of the winning gubernatorial candidate over the runner-up, and anticipate an inverse relationship with turnout if voters are rational and vote instrumentally. However, turnout rates are not predicted to be higher in close races
simply because an individual thinks that his or her vote is more likely to be
pivotal when the votes of others are more evenly split between the candidates.
As mentioned earlier (see the section on Background on Voter Turnout), candidates and their supporters rationally will invest more resources in getting
out the vote on Election Day if a race is expected to be tight since mobilizing
voters, especially those belonging to core constituency groups, has a larger
impact, at the margin, on the probability of winning.
In order to take into account concurrent presidential elections (PEY), we
include a dummy variable indicating whether the gubernatorial race appears
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on the same ballot as a presidential election. We expect a positive association between PEY and TUNROUT since elections occurring simultaneously create economies of scale for voters. To control for differences
across states in voter registration requirements, we include the number of
days before Election Day an individual must register to be eligible to vote
(REGDATE). We hypothesize that the farther in advance of an election a
voter must be registered, the higher is the cost of voting, and the lower turnout at the polls will tend to be (Calcagno and Westley 2008).

Empirical Analysis and Results
To rigorously test the proposition concerning public sector corruption and
voter turnout, we estimate the following regional fixed effects model:
TURNit ¼ a0 þ a1 Xit þ a2 Zit þ a3 logðCORRUPTÞit þ gi þ eit : ð1Þ
Since turnout is a percentage restricted between 0 and 100, it encounters
the econometric problems associated with estimating a doubly truncated
variable and to correct for this issue we transform the dependent variable
logistically.11 TURNit thus is computed as ln[TURNOUT/(1  TURNOUT)],
for region i at time t.
The Xit vector includes the following six demographic and socioeconomic variables: the population proportion of individuals of voting age
(VAP), the fraction of the population sixty-five years old and over (POP65),
the fraction of the population twenty-five years and over with a bachelor’s
degree (COLLEGE), the state unemployment rate (UNEMP), log of real
state per capita income (INCOME), and the state-specific poverty rate
(POVERTY). The Zit vector is composed of the following three political
variables: margin of the winning gubernatorial candidate’s victory over the
candidate placing second (CLOSENESS), concurrent presidential elections
(PEY), and voter registration requirements (REGDATE). CORRUPTit is
the number of convictions per capita by state and year, gi are the regional
fixed effects, and eit is the normally distributed residual term. Furthermore,
since our interest is in the partial effects of time-varying covariates, fixedeffects estimation is attractive because it allows any unobserved heterogeneity to be freely correlated with the time-varying covariates.
Before discussing the fixed-effects estimates of our model, an implicit
assumption of this model deserves attention. Specifically, we have thus far
assumed that our key independent variable, CORRUPT, is exogenous.
While we have found nothing in the literature to call this assumption into
question, it does seem at least plausible that corruption is itself influenced
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to some extent by voter turnout. That is, CORRUPT may be endogenous.
To test the assumption of exogeneity for CORRUPT, we use an instrumental variables approach applying both Hausman (1978) and DurbinWu-Hausman tests.
More specifically, we estimate a preliminary auxiliary model by
regressing CORRUPT on the regional fixed effects. From this regression,
predicted values are calculated for CORRUPT and then used in lieu of the
actual observations on CORRUPT in equation (1), thus allowing for the
exogeneity tests noted earlier. To identify the preliminary regression properly, we added as explanatory variables (1) the percentage of the population employed by the state government, POPGOV, and (2) the percentage
of the population living in urban areas, URBAN, to the other exogenous
variables in the baseline model. Both of these variables were found by
Glaeser and Saks (2006) to be statistically significant determinants of corruption. Thus, the added variables should serve well here as each has a relatively strong correlation with corruption but a comparatively weak
correlation with the dependent variable. These preliminary tests did not
reject the exogeneity of CORRUPT, thus reinforcing our confidence in the
specification of equation (1).12

Baseline Results
The empirical results from the estimation of equation (1) are presented in
table 3. To provide insight into the source of variation in the model, we
start with the baseline model estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS), with no fixed effects in column 1. Prior to discussing individual
outcomes it should be noted that the model generates a coefficient of multiple determination suggestive of a reasonable fit. Columns 2 and 3 present
the results of two regional fixed-effects regressions, one of the baseline
model and the second adding to the baseline model an interaction term
between CORRUPT and CLOSENESS.13 The idea here is that both corruption and closeness affect the payoff to electoral victory and therefore
corruption might affect turnout differently depending on the election’s
expected closeness. The standard errors for the baseline model and the
models estimated using regional fixed effects were corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White approach.
Broadly speaking, the empirical results in table 3 provide coefficient
estimates that strongly support our demand-side theory of the link between
public sector corruption and voter turnout. Specifically, in each of the three
regressions the coefficient on CORRUPT is both positive and statistically
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Table 3. Baseline Results for Turnout Estimation
(1)

Variable

OLS regression
coefficient

(2)
Regional
fixed-effects
coefficient

CORRUPT
.0425** (.0207)
.0416*** (.0172)
CLOSENESS
.0047*** (.0013)
.0051*** (.0011)
PEY
.5880*** (.0555)
.5743*** (.0371)
UNEMP (%)
.0189 (.0126)
.0169* (.0101)
VAP (%)
.0106*** (.0009)
.0096*** (.0014)
INCOME
.9244*** (.2754)
.6928*** (.1833)
POVERTY (%)
.0286*** (0.0075) .0157*** (0.0065)
REGDATE
0.0106*** (0.0024) 0.0069*** (0.0017)
POP65 (%)
0.0241 (0.0212)
0.0165* (0.0091)
COLLEGE (%)
0.0294*** (0.0094)
0.0191* (0.0070)
CORRUPT 
–
–
CLOSENESS
Constant
9.8829 (2.5607)
7.5634 (1.7630)
N
283
283
F-statistic
37.69
42.61
R2
.6375
–

(3)
Regional
fixed-effects
coefficient
.0327 (.0271)
.0019 (.0163)
.5723*** (.0375)
.0163 (.0102)
.0096*** (.0014)
.7010*** (.1846)
.0156*** (.0066)
.0069*** (.0017)
.0163* (.0091)
.0193*** (.0070)
.0005 (.0013)
7.5282 (1.7676)
283
38.64
–

Note. OLS ¼ ordinary least squares. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance levels of .01, .05, and .10, respectively.

significant.14 It is important to note that the coefficient on CORRUPT needs to
be interpreted with caution when we include the interaction term. That is, the
partial effect of CORRUPT on turnout is acorrupt þ acorrupt  closeness. Furthermore, when analyzing the impact of corruption on turnout in the presence of
the interaction term, we chose interesting values of closeness, such as the
mean value, and the lower and upper quartiles in the sample.15 We found
that CORRUPT in every case has a positive and statistically significant
effect on turnout regardless of the value of CLOSENESS chosen. Since
the interaction term, CORRUPT  CLOSENESS, does not materially
change our overall results or the effect of corruption on turnout we
exclude it from the estimations that follow.
Turning to the socioeconomic control variables, we find results as
expected. The size of the VAP exerts a negative and significant influence
on voter turnout, suggesting that the smaller the probability of an individual’s vote being decisive, the less incentive there is to participate. POP65 has
a positive effect on voter turnout, but it is statistically significant only for
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the fixed-effects models and only at the 10 percent level. Specifically, older
voters turn out in greater numbers because they have more experience relative to the younger population and their opportunity cost of participating in
an election is lower. We find a positive and significant effect on voter turnout from educational attainment (COLLEGE), indicating that a more
highly educated population is better able to take advantage of information
and thus perceives larger benefits from voting. As expected, states with
higher unemployment rates, UNEMP, also have larger voter turnout rates,
but that variable was statistically significant only at the 10 percent level in
one of the fixed-effects models. We find, in addition, that measures of per
capita income (INCOME) and the poverty rate (POVERTY) both have
negative and statistically significant impacts on voter turnout at the 1 percent level in all three models.
Equally predictable outcomes are found for the political variables. The
margin of victory of the winning gubernatorial candidate (CLOSENESS) has
a negative and significant effect on voter turnout in Columns 1, 2, and 3. This
result is consistent with the Downsian model: as gubernatorial races
become more competitive people go to the polls in larger numbers because
they believe that their votes are more likely to influence the outcome. We
find that concurrent presidential elections (PEY) have a positive and significant effect on voter turnout, suggesting that having a national election at
the top of the same ballot as a gubernatorial race attracts more voters to the
polls. Finally, as anticipated, more stringent voter registration requirements
(REGDATE) have a negative and significant impact on turnout, indicating
that having to qualify to vote far in advance of an election increases the cost
of voting.

Robustness Checks
In this section, we consider a number of robustness checks of our main finding that corruption has a positive effect on gubernatorial election turnout.
First, as noted in the literature, measuring public corruption as the number
of officials convicted of misusing their offices, regardless of whether those
offices are at the local, state, or federal levels, creates potential problems for
how many instances of corruption are uncovered, how vigorously such
charges are pursued and how many officials actually are convicted across
the fifty US states. Therefore, we use an alternate measure of corruption
taken from Boylan and Long (2003). In 1998–99, Boylan and Long
(2003) surveyed ‘‘state house’’ news reporters on their perceptions of state
government corruption. Respondents were asked to rate their state in terms
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of the level of corruption of all government employees on a 7-point scale,
from least corrupt (1) to most corrupt (7). CORRUPTION is defined as the
average of reporters’ ratings from each state.
The survey-based corruption measure has its drawbacks, including the
subjective nature of the responses, along with being limited to a single year.
In order to compare the survey-based corruption measure (available only for
1999) and the convictions-based measure of corruption (yearly data 1978–
2004), we first calculated the average annual number of convictions per
state from 1978 through 2004, instead of selecting individual years arbitrarily. The correlation between the two measures of corruption is .41. It is
important to note that, although we would have preferred to use the number of convictions in 1999 in our cross-sectional analysis (to compare
corruption measures for the same year), only two states held
gubernatorial elections in 1999. The lack of data prompted us to use the
average value of the convictions-based measure of corruption over our full
sample. Columns 1 and 2 in table 4 pool our data cross-sectionally to test
whether Boylan and Long’s (2003) survey-based measure of corruption is
consistent with the Justice Department’s convictions-based measure. In
column 1, we estimate an OLS model using the average values of the variables in our model, including the observations on CORRUPT, to see
whether the results still hold. CORRUPT is still positive and significant
but only at the 10 percent level. In column 2, we enter Boylan and Long’s
(2003) survey-based measure of corruption in place of CORRUPT and
find that it enters with a positive and significant coefficient.
Second, to determine whether our results are sensitive to the independent
variables chosen for our baseline model specifications, we add five additional explanatory variables: the population of African Americans as a share
of total population (POPBLACK), the female population as a share of total
population (POPFEMALE), a dummy variable indicating that the governor
running for reelection for a consecutive term is an incumbent (INCUMBENT), a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the gubernatorial
candidate belongs to the Democratic party (PARTY), and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the candidate is a former governor
(FRGOV). These additional variables are obtained from the US Census
Bureau and the Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures Database (Jensen
and Beyle 2003, 2007). All of these independent variables have been used
previously in voter turnout models, but, according to Geys (2006), none
has been included routinely, nor have they produced unambiguous empirical results. Thus, we add them only for sensitivity analysis and not as part
of our baseline estimation.
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0.0500
(0.0603)
0.0235***
(0.0039)
1.6185**
(0.6876)
0.0684***
(0.0267)
0.0131**
(0.0059)
0.0370
(0.0281)
0.0356
(0.0244)

UNEMP (%)

COLLEGE (%)

POP65 (%)

REGDATE

POVERTY (%)

INCOME

VAP (%)

PEY

0.0052
(0.0102)
–

0.2004*
(0.1169)

(1)
Coefficient

CLOSENESS

CORRUPTION

CORRUPT

Variable

Table 4. Robustness Checks

0.0469
(0.0505)
0.0259***
(0.0042)
0.4191
(0.6976)
0.0331
(0.0256)
0.0127**
(0.0062)
0.0537**
(0.0242)
0.0280
(0.0263)

0.1828***
(0.0410)
0.0108
(0.0096)
–

(2)
Coefficient

0.0050***
(0.0011)
0.5841***
(0.0372)
0.0193**
(0.0101)
0.0094***
(0.0014)
0.6992***
(0.1822)
0.0189***
(0.0067)
0.0074***
(0.0017)
0.0217**
(0.0094)
0.0176***
(0.0070)

0.0424***
(0.0171)

(3)
Coefficient

0.0050***
(0.0011)
0.5794***
(0.0370)
0.0218**
(0.0103)
0.0095***
(0.0014)
0.6487***
(0.1835)
0.0163***
(0.0065)
0.0072***
(0.0016)
0.0197**
(0.0092)
0.0192***
(0.0070)

0.0440***
(0.0171)

(4)
Coefficient

0.0051***
(0.0011)
0.5745***
(0.0373)
0.0169*
(0.0101)
0.0096***
(0.0014)
0.6940***
(0.1845)
0.0157***
(0.0066)
0.0069***
(0.0017)
0.0165*
(0.0091)
0.0192***
(0.0070)

0.0415***
(0.0173)

(5)
Coefficient

0.0049***
(0.0011)
0.5736***
(0.0371)
0.0151
(0.0102)
0.0095***
(0.0014)
0.7109***
(0.1834)
0.0167***
(0.0066)
0.0067***
(0.0017)
0.0174**
(0.0091)
0.0200***
(0.0070)

0.0442***
(0.0172)

(6)
Coefficient

(continued)

-0.0039***
(0.0012)
0.5761***
(0.0369)
0.0146
(0.0101)
0.0099***
(0.0014)
0.7038***
(0.1821)
0.0158***
(0.0065)
0.0070***
(0.0016)
0.0176**
(0.0090)
0.0192***
(0.0070)

0.0389**
(0.0171)

(7)
Coefficient
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Note. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance levels of .01, .05, and .10, respectively.

N
F-tatistic
R2

7.5698
(1.7518)
283
39.63

–

INCUMBENT

Constant

–

0.0054**
(0.0026)
–

(3)
Coefficient

FRGOV

7.8059
(6.4794)
47
12.49
.5072

(2)
Coefficient

–

20.0484
(7.1959)
50
9.99
.4047

(1)
Coefficient

PARTY

POPFEMALE (%)

POPBLACK (%)

Variable

Table 4. (continued)

7.4697
(1.7534)
283
39.56

–

7.5748
(1.7732)
283
38.59

–

7.7553
(1.7643)
283
39.09

0.0976
(0.0674)
–

–

0.0022**
(0.0308)
–

–

–

–

0.0076**
(0.0037)
–

–

(6)
Coefficient

–

(5)
Coefficient

–

(4)
Coefficient

0.0709***
(0.0331)
7.6727
(1.7519)
283
31.4

–

–

–

–

(7)
Coefficient
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Black and female voters often are argued to be important demographic
voting blocs. POPBLACK and POPFEMALE allow us to consider whether
our results for corruption and voter turnout are affected by controlling for
either of these state-specific demographic characteristics. Three additional
dummy variables control for other candidate characteristics. The literature
on voter turnout has long debated the importance of an incumbency advantage. INCUMBENT may reduce voter turnout as voters expect the incumbent to win by a comfortable margin. On the other hand, politicians’ popular
support tends to degrade the longer they have been in office (Martins and
Veiga 2011). The variable PARTY asks whether a candidate’s political
party affiliation affects voter turnout. Both sides of the aisle have incentives
to mobilize voters and so the sign here is ambiguous. Finally, FRGOV
indicates that the candidate has left office and then later reentered the race
for the governor’s mansion, often after having been ruled ineligible to succeed himself by state law. A popular former governor rerunning for office
may cause voter turnout to increase. The new estimates are presented in
columns 3 through 7 in table 4. In each instance, the results are supportive
of the notion that corruption is positively and significantly correlated with
turnout. The supplementary control variables are all statistically significant, except for FRGOV, but the addition of these variables does not
change the signs or statistical significances of any of the independent variables from the baseline estimation.
Corruption being positive and statistically significant in all of our estimations provides us with confidence that a positive correlation exists between
voter turnout and corruption. However, this alone does not fully demonstrate our demand-side hypothesis since it is possible that voter turnout
in the presence of public corruption could be caused by attempts to ‘‘vote
the rascals out.’’
Finally, we examine gubernatorial elections involving incumbent
candidates and ask whether they are more or less likely to be returned by
the voters to office. If the positive correlation between corruption and turnout is explained by voters’ intentions to remove corrupt politicians from
office, then that motive should be evident in a propensity to defeat gubernatorial incumbents in the presence of widespread corruption. The raw
data suggest the following electoral consequences: there are a total of
369 gubernatorial elections in our sample, and in 204 of those elections
an incumbent governor was on the ballot; the voters returned the incumbent to office in 158 of those elections, yielding a 77 percent reelection
rate. Hence, in nearly 43 percent of the elections in our sample (158 out
of 369), an incumbent was reelected, and in almost 45 percent of the total,
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Table 5. Election Subsamples Based on Incumbent Status

Variable
CORRUPT
CLOSENESS
PEY
UNEMP (%)
VAP (%)
INCOME
POVERTY (%)
REGDATE
POP65 (%)
COLLEGE (%)
Constant
N
F-statistic

(1)
Elections where
incumbent wins
coefficient

(2)
Election winners
not incumbent
coefficient

(3)
Elections with
no incumbents
coefficient

(4)
Elections
incumbent lost
coefficient

0.0446
(0.0310)
0.0051***
(0.0019)
0.5797***
(0.0650)
0.0084
(0.0198)
0.0186
(0.0201)
0.7431**
(0.3533)
0.0194
(0.0122)
0.0014
(0.0034)
0.0256
(0.0219)
0.0197
(0.0126)
8.5746
(3.0348)
117
14.78

0.0442**
(0.0210)
0.0026
(0.0017)
0.5739***
(0.0460)
0.0168
(0.0120)
0.0103***
(0.0013)
0.5875***
(0.2294)
0.0147*
(0.0079)
0.0096***
(0.0019)
0.0157
(0.0108)
0.0166**
(0.0084)
6.6888
(2.2321)
166
27.67

0.0516**
(0.0229)
0.0036*
(0.0020)
0.5714***
(0.0510)
0.0163
(0.0132)
0.0111***
(0.0014)
0.6534***
(0.2515)
0.0164*
(0.0094)
0.0115***
(0.0023)
0.0091
(0.0123)
0.0177**
(0.0089)
7.6659
(2.4632)
133
24.71

0.0893
(0.0752)
0.0011
(0.0054)
0.5994***
(0.1431)
0.0188
(0.0383)
0.0125
(0.0704)
0.4835
(1.4002)
0.0036
(0.0183)
0.0065
(0.0057)
0.0475
(0.0482)
0.0258
(0.0507)
1.3988
(11.2622)
33
4.44

Note. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance levels of .01, .05, and .10, respectively.

no incumbent was running for office. That figure implies that in nearly
half of our sample, the electorate did not have an opportunity to vote a
‘‘rascal’’ out, since the seat was open.
Thus, we divide our sample based on whether an incumbent is running
and whether he or she won the election. Table 5 provides results from the
various estimations on four different subsamples of the data. We continue
to use regional fixed effects and to correct the error terms for heteroscedasticity. Before we proceed, it should be noted that each of these subsamples
is at best only half as large as our overall sample. Yet, the F statistics continue to be significant. Column 1 examines the elections in which the
incumbent won, where CORRUPT is positive, but not significant. In column 2, we estimate the baseline model for all elections in which the winner
was not the incumbent and found that CORRUPT is positive and
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statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Our estimation in column 3
focuses on elections in which neither gubernatorial candidate was an incumbent; CORRUPT again is positive and significant. Finally, we examine the
smallest of the subsamples comprising elections in which the incumbent
lost. In this case, CORRUPT is statistically insignificant.
Column 3, wherein no incumbents enter the race, is the best test of our
demand-side hypothesis. In the absence of an incumbent, there is no rascal
to vote out. The sign and significance levels in this estimation are consistent
with the finding in our baseline estimation: candidates see value in holding
office for a variety of reasons, but value it more in states with ‘‘cultures of
corruption’’ because the rents potentially are larger. The prospect of collecting corruption rents creates strong incentives to invest more effort to get
voters to the polls on Election Day.
In summary, the results support with a reasonable level of confidence the
idea that public corruption raises voter turnout in gubernatorial elections.
Perhaps most importantly, this relationship appears rather insensitive to
alternative methods of estimation (OLS vs. fixed effects), alternate measure
of corruption, addition of demographic and political variables, and analyses
of various data subsamples.

Conclusion
Students of the political process have begun to recognize that candidates for
public office have strong incentives to mobilize their supporters on Election
Day that they; their party organizations, and political elites are the demanders of the votes the electorate supplies. This article contributes to the literature adopting a demand-side approach to explaining voter turnout by
linking electoral participation rates to the prevalence of public corruption.
Our conjecture is that more electoral effort will be expended and, hence,
turnout rates will be higher, when candidates seeking office perceive opportunities for misusing those offices for personal gain and the benefits of winning therefore are greater.
We test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of holding
public office and, therefore, elicit greater demand-side effort in building winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials
convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we model voter
turnout in US gubernatorial elections. Overall, our results provide relatively
strong and consistent support for the proposition that, in addition to socioeconomic determinants and political institutions, public corruption is relevant in
explaining the variability of voter turnout rates across states and over time.
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We do not mean to imply that, because voter turnout rates in corrupt
states are higher, ceteris paribus, than in less corrupt ones, corruption promotes citizen participation and more democratic elections. Our hypothesis
simply is that because political offices are worth more in jurisdictions where
corruption rents are available, candidates seeking office and their supporting organizations invest more effort in winning elections, effort that
increases the number of voters who go to the polls on Election Day.
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Notes
1. See Aldrich (1993) for a thorough analysis of the rational choice model of
voting.
2. An additional resolution to the voting paradox is offered by the theory of
expressive voting. According to Brennan and Hamlin (1998), expressive voters
are rational in their behavior, but their decision to vote are not dependent upon
the outcome of the election. Instead, voters are merely expressing a preference.
3. The literature on corruption is large and expanding quickly. See, for example,
Rose-Ackerman (1978), Meier and Holbrook (1992), Mauro (1995, 1998), Goel
and Nelson (1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Glaeser and Saks (2006).
4. Meier and Holbrook (1992) look at the historical, cultural, and political determinants of corruption, including voter turnout. They find that greater voter turnout reduces public corruption when only political variables are entered in their
model but do not find any statistical significance for voter turnout in their final
specification, which includes all three sets of factors. Peters and Welch (1980)
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5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10.
11.

12.

13.

14.
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examine US congressional races from 1968 to 1978, which involved 81 cases of
corruption and do not find that corruption affected turnout. It should be noted
that Peters and Welch’s empirical model was based on a supply-side theory
of voter turnout and that a dummy variable was used to indicate the existence
of corruption.
For more on this issue, see Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Wooldridge (2002).
For more on this issue, see Geys (2006).
Endersby , Galatas, and Rackaway (2002) and Geys (2006) suggest that this calculation is among the most common for measuring turnout. In addition, because
not all states compile accurate records on the number of registered voters, we
use voting age population as a proxy for registered voters.
The use of conviction rates as a measure of corruption has become common in
the literature. See, for instance, Meir and Holbrook (1992), Goel and Nelson
(1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Glaeser and Saks (2006).
Missing observations for the percentages of the population twenty-five years
old and over with a bachelor’s degree are interpolated using the ipolate function
of STATA in order to apply a standard procedure instead of using our own criterion. Similar methods of handling missing data have been adopted by others,
such as Primo and Milyo (2006).
See, inter alia, Matsusaka (1995) and Primo and Milyo (2006).
These problems are easily solved by transforming TURNOUT from a probability to the logarithm of the corresponding odds ratio via a simple logistic transformation. After the transformation, the dependent variable ranges from
negative infinity to positive infinity, eliminating predictions outside the allowable range.
The null hypothesis is that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. The
w2 coefficient from the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is 4.75, with a p value of.
9071, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Where region one is the omitted region for the regional fixed effects estimations. Region one is New England and includes the following states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
The dependent variable is the log odds of turnout and corruption is measured as
the natural log of convictions per capita, and so the coefficient needs proper
interpretation. As a rough calculation of a ‘‘marginal effect’’ of corruption
on turnout, we take the difference of the natural log of the mean of corruption
convictions per capita and the mean plus 1 standard deviation (SD). Multiplying this difference by the coefficient of corruption gives us a value the exponent of which allows us to back out the ‘‘marginal effect.’’ The result gives us
a value of 1.042, which means approximately a 4 percent change in voter
turnout.
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15. The partial effect of CORRUPT on turnout is acorrupt þ acorruptcloseness. Using the
mean value of CLOSENESS, the coefficient of CORRUPT in column 3 is 0.0327
þ (0.0005  16.5) ¼ .04095. Similar calculations can be carried out at the
upper and lower quartile values of CLOSENESS.
16. We found that accounting for the interaction between closeness and
corruption in every instance had a negative and statistically significant effect
on turnout, regardless of the measure of corruption chosen, including the mean
value and the lower and upper quartiles in the sample.
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